Strategic Interactions in Networks: An Experimental Approach by 이응익
 
 
저 시-비 리- 경 지 2.0 한민  
는 아래  조건  르는 경 에 한하여 게 
l  저 물  복제, 포, 전송, 전시, 공연  송할 수 습니다.  
다 과 같  조건  라야 합니다: 
l 하는,  저 물  나 포  경 ,  저 물에 적 된 허락조건
 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.  
l 저 터  허가를 면 러한 조건들  적 되지 않습니다.  
저 에 른  리는  내 에 하여 향  지 않습니다. 
것  허락규약(Legal Code)  해하  쉽게 약한 것 니다.  
Disclaimer  
  
  
저 시. 하는 원저 를 시하여야 합니다. 
비 리. 하는  저 물  리 목적  할 수 없습니다. 
경 지. 하는  저 물  개 , 형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다. 
Strategic Interactions in Networks:
An Experimental Approach∗
Eungik Lee
May 31, 2017
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates how characteristics of a network influence
the equilibrium selection and individual behavior in a public goods games played
on networks. Bramoullé et al. (2014) shows that the equilibrium of the public good
game can be characterized according to the simple characteristics of the underly-
ing network. Precisely, guided by the theoretical predictions from Bramoullé et al.
(2014), I explore whether underlying networks can predict equilibrium selection and
subjects’ behavior in the controlled laboratory. The data implies that 1) there is
some aspect in which agents’ actions are consistent with the claims of Bramoullé
et al. (2014), but 2) degree distribution of the network are more fundamental in
influencing behavior and equilibrium selection. Specifically, I show that asymmetry
in degree distribution inside of a network is a major factor that explains the actions
of individual economic agents.
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1 Introduction
Although the traditional economics model yields a number of powerful insights about
implications of rational decisions for resource allocation and welfare, it seems not to be
able to explain some tenacious empirical regularities, like persistent inequalities, patterns
of technology diffusion, or sociological phenomena like segregation of neighborhoods. In
the recent past the traditional model of human activities, occurring within markets with
anonymous and centralized interaction, has been further developed to also take into
account the network in which the actors are embedded. In fact, the economics of social
networks has gained increasing attention in the past decade, manifested in an explosion of
game theoretical models on formation, stability, efficiency of networks. In the real world,
there are a wide variety of settings where social network play a role; this leads to an
almost endless set of interesting avenues to investigate (Jackson (2005)). As predictions
from models proliferate, I test these trend of network theories to determine whether they
truly understand the behavior of economic agents.
I conduct the first of such a test for the well-known network model of Bramoullé
et al. (2014). They are motivated by their previous work Bramoullé and Kranton (2007)
which made a first set up for local public good games in which individuals are part of
networks and invest the contribution of public goods. Model of Bramoullé et al. (2014) is
characterized by two main features: first, agents are embedded in a fixed network. second,
agents’ payoffs are directly affected by their partners’ actions only. In Bramoullé et al.
(2014), they suggest theory explaining the impact of network structure to the equilibrium
profile. Their set-up is quite similar with Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). However, they
introduce a "decay" factor between agents, which means that there is a smoothed impact of
each players’ action to their connected neighbors. Their main result is that the structure
of network can affect the amplification of the agents’ actions. Their analysis leads to
these insights. First when the global networks structure sufficiently amplifies the strategic
substitute of contributions (override the decay factor between agents), networks can lead
to specialization, and that in any network there is a specialized equilibrium1. Second,
when the global networks structure cannot amplify the strategic substitute of action
between agents, then the network has a unique and active Nash equilibrium2. These
theoretical results show that the network structure is critical to equilibrium prediction
and individual behavior.
I designed an experiment to explicitly address and identify the impact of network
structure to the equilibrium selection and behavior of agents described in Bramoullé
1Specialized equilibrium is an equilibrium where some contribute fully, while others free-ride on equi-
librium.
2Active equilibrium is an equilibrium where all agent have positive contribution
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et al. (2014). The main results and hypotheses of this paper are followings: First, this
paper test whether individuals are indeed able to coordinate on equilibria prediction of
Bramoullé et al. (2014). This paper finds that there is no clear statistically significant
changes in equilibrium selection described in Bramoullé et al. (2014). However, this pa-
per finds some changes in individual behavior which implies that the treatment effect is
not strong enough to changes the selection of equilibrium. Second, this paper finds that
equilibrium selection is strikingly depend on other network structure, especially, degree
distribution. Specifically, when there is asymmetric degree distribution between agents,
agents are coordinate on specialized equilibrium more frequently by following their de-
gree. Possible mechanism explaining this behavior is focal point (Schelling (1960)). This
results shows that agents’ equilibrium selections are strongly correlated with their degree
distribution which is not described in Bramoullé et al. (2014). Third, I test other network
characteristics which have been described as important for individual behavior in other
literature. By using this network characteristics, I find significant changes in equilibrium
selection.
2 Previous Literature
There are large literature regarding experiment and theory regarding strategic choice
under network. The first group of experiments which have interest on network struc-
ture and equilibrium selection. Keser et al. (1998) present the first experiments that
consider the role of the global structure of networks in coordination games. In their ex-
periment, agents are located on a circle, and on a two-dimensional lattice, and while the
size of an agent’s neighborhood remains constant across treatments, the neighborhood
structure differs.Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012) is the first paper about relation between
individual choice in public good games and network. They made 7 networks variation
under theoretical basis of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) to see the effect of equilibrium
selection. However, they find coordination failure to the equilibrium. They adopted con-
tinuous action space, therefore, on average less than 3% of samples can coordinate on
the equilibrium even though they lessen the concept of equilibrium. It is hard to see the
equilibrium selection issues. Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012), however, find evidence that
network structure affect to free-riding incentive of individuals. They find that as aver-
age degree increases, the free-riding incentive increases significantly. Another literature
Charness et al. (2014) find the informational uncertainty and equilibrium selection on
networks. They find that stable equilibrium is selected most frequently. They examined
also that uncertainty about network structure seriously harms efficiency of contribution.
A second group of experiments focuses on cooperation on networks. Kirchkamp and
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Nagel (2007) investigated the effect of local interaction on learning and cooperation in
repeated prisoners’ dilemmas. They compare interaction neighborhoods of different size
and structure, and observe choices under different information conditions. Interestingly
their experimental findings contradict the theoretical predictions of naive imitation mod-
els. Cassar (2007) studies coordination games and prisoners’ dilemmas in local, random
and small-world networks. She finds a tendency for coordination on the payoff-dominant
equilibrium on all three networks. Her results suggest that local interactions do cause
faster coordination than random interactions, but do so on the payoff-dominant equilib-
rium rather than on the risk-dominant equilibrium. For the cooperation game, she finds
insufficient cooperation on all three networks. Average cooperation is found to be lower
in small-world networks than in random and local networks. Pla et al. (2009) conducted
an experiment to estimate subjects’ bounded rationality in a network game with unique
equilibrium predictions. They find evidence that subjects are boundedly rational in the
sense that they only consider their neighborhood of distance two.
A third line of experiments investigates individual incentives for network formation.
Goeree et al. (2009) analyze a pure network formation game and find that equilibrium
predictions fail completely with homogeneous agents, while heterogeneity fosters the for-
mation of an efficient structure over time. Corten and Buskens (2010) find some evidence
that subjects will form networks that lead to play of the efficient Nash equilibrium in a
simple coordination game, if they can choose their network partners themselves. Burger
and Buskens (2009) test whether formation processes lead to predicted stable outcomes in
different simple settings and find largely support of the theory. Van Dolder and Buskens
(2009) find varying evidence for effects of social motives on network formation process.
Results of the experiments so far have shown that network configurations have impor-
tant effects on economic outcomes, such as the convergence towards equilibrium selection,
coordination, and network formation. This paper contribute to this research by focusing
on the effect of network configurations on equilibrium selection while conducting experi-
ment on the basis of Bramoullé et al. (2014).
3 Theoretical Background
In this section, I briefly summarize the model and findings of Bramoullé et al. (2014) and
bring the theory to a testable hypothesis. Suppose that there areN agents who are located
in fixed networks and let xi ≥ 0 denote agent i’s level of actions while x−i denote the
actions of all agents other than i. Agents play the simultaneous local public good games.
Agents are arranged in a network which is represented by an undirected network g, gij ∈
{0, 1}, gij = gji, for all i, j ∈ N . By collecting this link information we can construct
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the n × n adjacency matrix G. A payoff parameter δ ≥ 0 measures how much i and j
affect each others’ payoffs given they are connected. Each agent receives benefit from their
neighbors’ action given network structure and her marginal cost to her own contribution
is constant. Therefore, agent i’s payoff can be represented as ui(xi, x−i, δ, G) = b(xi +
δ
∑
gijxj) − κixi with b
′
> 0, b′′ < 0. They assume b′(0) > κi to avoid trivial cases. It is
straightforward to show that agents have a linear best-reply form as follows.
fi(x−i, δ, G) =
x̄i − δ
∑
j gijxj if δ
∑
j gijxj < x̄i
0 if δ∑j gijxj ≥ x̄i
The amount of action between neighbors are strategic substitutes ; the more action
an agent take, the less incentive neighbors’ take. In Nash equilibrium, all agents in the
network take the linear best reply from described as above. The action profile of a network
is active when the amount of actions are strictly positive for all agents. This means that
there is no free-rider in a network. The action profile in a network is specialized when the
action of agents in a network is either 0 or x̄. This suggests specialization between agents.
Some agents fully contribute to the public goods, while some agents do not contribute
and free ride their contribution. They suggest one simple measure to capture the strategic
substitute which represent as the lowest eigenvalue of adjacent matrix. As the absolute
value of lowest eigenvalue increases, the structure of network amplifies well the substitute
between agents. This can be interpreted as the incentive of free-riding increases because
of network structure.
The first hypothesis is about the main result of Bramoullé et al. (2014). In their the-
ory, as the lowest eigenvalue increases, a specialized equilibrium profile is added to the
equilibria set. Therefore, the prediction of equilibrium selection is that agents coordinate
on the specialized equilibrium profile more easily Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012), show
that the frequency of converging specialized equilibria is less than 0.5% even though
the specialized equilibria is in the theoretical prediction. This means that agents have a
tendency to avoid the specialized equilibrium. However, they did not control the global
and local network characteristics. To test this concern more systematically, I controlled
global and local characteristics except the lowest eigenvalue, and I made the following
first hypothesis.
(H.1) As the lowest eigenvalue increases, individuals are able to coordinate on the
corresponding specialized equilibria.
The second hypothesis is about the role of δ. Different from the |λmin|, δ is related
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more directly to the agent’s payoff.Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012) and Charness et al.
(2014), did not include δ treatments. From a theoretical perspective, as δ increases, the
incentive to take a free-ride on the other player’s contributions will increase. Bramoullé
et al. (2014) show that the increase of δ is interpreted as the magnitude of amplifying
the strategic substitute between players increases. This effect is the same as an increase
of |λmin| in theoretical perspective. Therefore this paper tests whether the equilibrium
selection changes following a change of δ.
(H.2) As δ increases, Individuals are able to coordinate on the corresponding special-
ized equilibria.
The third hypothesis is stated to capture the behavioral aspect in an equilibrium se-
lection. In Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) made statement about the asymmetry of degree
distribution in networks : on any core-periphery graph, there exists the following Nash
equilibrium: No core agent exerts effort, each peripheral agent exerts effort. These re-
sults imply that in a core-periphery network, the specialized equilibrium becomes salient.
Therefore, I test the impact of asymmetry of network to the specialized equilibrium se-
lection.
(H.3) In a core-periphery network, individuals are able to coordinate on specialized
equilibria more frequently.
The fourth hypothesis is about the average degree of networks. Rosenkranz and
Weitzel (2012) find that the contribution decreases as a link is added to the agent. This
means that an increase in the average degree also increases the incentive to free-ride. I
hypothesized that the behavior of agents are specialized easily when the average degree
is higher. Therefore, the specialized equilibria are selected more frequently.
(H.4) As average degree increases, individuals are able to coordinate on the specialized
equilibrium more frequently.
4 Experimental Design
4.1 Network games
In the experimental set-up, each agent plays a simultaneous game that is implemented
by random positioning and random matching. To prevent people from recognizing the
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game as a type of repeated game, I recruited 24 people in each session and divide them
into groups which is composed of 12 people. Inside each group, people were randomly
assigned in each position by every period. 6 individuals were randomly matched in a in a
12 person group to form a connected network g. In the game, individuals’ pure strategies
at each stage consists of choosing 0,1, or 2. Agents can choose among free-riding action
(choose 0), moderate action (choose 1), and full action (choose 2). Payoffs at each period
are calculated using the following benefit function.
ui(xi, x−i, G, δ) = 1000(xi + δ
∑
gijxj)
1
2 − 500xi
The above utility function satisfies the assumptions of Bramoullé et al. (2014). The
exchange rate of real money is 10 :1. As treatments, I considered a series of 7 combinations
of δ and different network structures, as depicted in the following Figure 1. In the figures
there are 6 circles and lines. Circles represent the position of players and lines designate
when two agents are connected.
−Figure1−
The first network characteristic is the lowest eigenvalue of network. Turtle, Circle and
Core-periphery network have the same lowest eigenvalue 2, while Wheel network has 3.
The second network characteristic is symmetry in degree distribution. Turtle, Wheel, and
Circle networks have a symmetric degree distribution which means that all of the agents
in the networks have the same number of agents. However, in core-periphery network
the degree distribution is asymmetric. There exists core-position players who have more
neighbors than the periphery-position. The third characteristic is average degree. Turtle,
Wheel and Core-periphery networks have 3 average degrees for all agents, while the circle
network has 2 average degrees. The characteristics of each of the networks are given in
Table 1.
−Table1−
When δ×|λmin| is greater than 1, there exists multiple equilibria. On the other hand,
when δ×|λmin| is less than 1, there exists a unique equilibrium. More specific equilibrium
profiles are shown in Table 2.
−Table2−
In Table 2, the equilibrium profile of each of the networks is shown. when δ×|λmin| is
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less than 1, there exists a unique equilibrium and active equilibrium which all agents con-
tribute positive amount of contribution in equilibrium. The main hypothesis is captured
by the treatment of Wheel, δ0.35 and Turtle , δ0.35. sustain specialized equilibrium, on the
other hand, Turtle, δ0.35 cannot sustain the specialized equilibrium. There is unique and
active equilibrium only.
As δ increases from 0.35 to 0.75, the equilibria set are multiple and include the spe-
cialized equilibrium profile. For example, in Circle network, |λmin| is 2. When δ is 0.35,
(1,1,1,1,1,1) is unique and equilibrium. While δ is 0.75, (1,1,1,1,1,1) and (2,0,2,0,2,0) are
equilibria. This setting is to test the main results of Bramoullé et al. (2014) which means
players can coordinate this specialized equilibrium (2,0,2,0,2,0) also as δ increases because
the equilibria set include this new profile.
4.2 Procedural details
In total 17 sessions were run at the experimental laboratory at CEBSS at Seoul National
University in December 2015 and April 2016. Participating subjects were recruited from
an online website that can be only used by Seoul National University students. The
procedure during the sessions was same and all sessions, and all sessions are computerized,
using a program written with z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). 256 subjects participated and
were seated in a random order at PCs in a laboratory. Instructions (see Appendix1)
were then read aloud and questions were answered in private. Subjects were randomly
assigned to groups of size N=12, within each group, subjects were randomly positioned
in the network N=6. Throughout the sessions students were not allowed to communicate
each other and could not see others’ screen. The summary statistics for each network are
shown in Table 3.
−Table3−
In the experiment, each subject played 2 independent sections of experiment. The
first section consists of network games where each player makes a decision, the second
part is a risk assessment. In the first part, subjects make a decision in a network for 40
periods. For each period, they are assigned to a random position in a network. Their
payment is decided by the sum of earnings they earn by each period. This design is
a direct translation from the original settings in Bramoullé et al. (2014). During every
period, subjects were informed about their position and payoff matrix on the screen and
they determined the actions among 0,1, and 2 to take in that period. After each period
ended, each player received a detailed feedback about what his/her neighbors chose (not
all the players in networks) and payoff at that period. The sequence of treatments for
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the 17 sessions has been processed by several concerns: I used a random assignment rule
in the 12 agents not 6 agents to reduce the probability to match people with each other
again. This set-up is crucial to understanding game rules because Bramoullé et al. (2014)
assumes simultaneous game with strangers. To prevent the issue regarding an ordering
effect, I designed the experiment as between subjects design. Thus, agents selected their
choice only in a certain given network and given delta for 40 periods.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Impact of Lowest eigenvalue
5.1.1 Equilibrium selection
In this section, I compare the equilibrium convergence between (Turtle, δ0.35) and (Wheel,δ0.35).
The difference between these two networks is the lowest eigenvalue, whereas all other
network characteristics are controlled. The summary of the network characteristics and
convergence ratios are presented in Table 4.
−Table4−
When δ = 0.35, there is an active unique equilibrium in (Turtle, δ0.35) while (Wheel,
δ0.35) has multiple equilibria including the specialized equilibrium ((2,0,2,0,2,0)). To be
specific, (1,1,1,1,1,1) is an active equilibrium that is compatible in both networks. How-
ever, (2,0,2,0,2,0) is only compatible in the wheel network. This theoretical prediction
implies that agents can coordinate on the specialized equilibrium more frequently.
In Table 4, the overall convergence rate in active equilibrium is not different un-
der 5% level between two networks. Regarding specialized equilibrium, in (Turtle,δ0.35)
the frequency of choosing (2,0,2,0,2,0) (out of equilibrium path) is 13. in (Wheel,δ0.35)
the frequency of choosing (2,0,2,0,2,0) (out of equilibrium path) is 6(2.5%). The overall
frequency on the specialized equilibria between (Turtle, δ0.35) and (Wheel, δ0.35) is not
different at 5% level. This results shows that agents coordinate on the active equilibrium
not specialized equilibrium even though there is a changes in theoretical prediction. This
pattern is in line with Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012). Their results show that in circle
which is composed of 4 agents and complete networks, all agents contribute strictly more
than 0 which implies active equilibrium in this case.
−Figure2−
3I checked the out of equilibrium frequency.
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Figure 2 checks the equilibrium convergence ratio across periods. In both network,
there is an increasing convergence trends as period flows. The correlation between con-
vergence rate and period is 0.254 in Turtle and 0.246 in Wheel which are statistically
significant at 1% level in both treatments. They have very same trend of convergence
in active equilibrium ratio which is not statistically different at 5% level across first 10
period, period 11 30, and last 10 period. This means that the trend to converge on the
active equilibrium is the same for all periods. Second, if we divide the period as 3 parts,
there is significant increase on the convergence of the specialized equilibrium which is
statistically different at 5% level in the first 10 periods. In (Wheel, δ0.35), the equilib-
rium convergence on the specialized equilibrium is 7.9% in the first 10 period and last
10 period 0%. This difference is statistically significant at 5% level in the first 10 periods
only . This results implies that the convergence to the specialized equilibrium decreases
as period goes which means agents learn to coordinate on the active equilibrium.
5.1.2 Individual Behavior
In the previous section, the results shows that people coordinate on the active equilibrium
not on the specialized equilibrium. However, the equilibrium convergence is possible only
when all 6 agents in the group chose the best response to each other. Therefore, in this
section, I check whether the individual behavior of agents between the two networks is
different. To verify, define specialized action to mean that 0 (Free-ride) or 2 (full contri-
bution). In theoretical perspective, the individual behavior changes in a more speicalized
way because specialized equilibrium is in the theoretical prediction in (Wheel, δ0.35) while
not in (Turtle, δ0.35). Figure 3 shows the ratio of choice between the (Wheel, δ0.35) and
(Turtle, δ0.35).
−Figure3−
Figure 3 shows the contribution across (Wheel, δ0.35) and (Turtle, δ0.35). There are
14.3% decreases those of who select 1(moderate action). This also means that there is
increase on the proportion those of who select specialized actions. On average there is
a 1.10 contribution in (Wheel, δ0.35) and 1.04 in (Turtle, δ0.35). They are statistically
different at 5% level. To test this in a regression table, I set the dependent variable cspec
as follows.
cspec =
1 if c ∈ {0, 2},0 O.W
This dependent variable captures the specialized behavior of agents that is not cap-
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tured by the equilibrium selection part. Table 5 shows the effect of increased lowest eigen-
value to the specialized actions. The average degree and symmetry in degree distribution
is controlled as described in the previous section. Therefore, the wheel network dummy
variable demonstrate the effect of lowest eigenvalue on the specialized action. Fixed effect
includes period dummies and position dummies. Standard errors are clustered by each
individuals.
−Table5−
Table 5 shows the effect of the increased |λmin| on the specialized behavior. In all
specifications, the proportion of agents who chose specialized action increased by about
7% which is significant at the 5% level in the model (1). After controlling for the woman,
risk aversion and period fixed effect, there is an 6% increase which is significant at 5% level
on the specialized action. Table 5 shows that the specialized action of agents increases in
the wheel network. This is consistent with the theory of Bramoullé et al. (2014). These
are the first results that find changes of individual behavior caused by global network
characteristic after controlling for the local network characteristics. However, this result
is too weak to increase the convergence of specialized equilibrium.
5.2 Impact of δ in Networks.
5.2.1 Equilibrium selection
In the previous section, this paper showed the impact of |λmin| in the equilibrium selection.
In this part, I test the theory related with δ, the payoff decay factor. In theory, δ has an
interaction with |λmin|. This means that from a theoretical perspective, as δ increases, the
strategic substitute between agents increase also. This paper have 3 networks variation
according to the increase of δ. In Turtle and Circle network, the equilibrium set expands
while, Wheel network has the same equilibria set.
−Table6−
Table 6 represents the amount of equilibrium convergence in each of the networks.
First, regardless of δ, there is a trend to converge to the active equilibrium. In the multiple
equilibria case, there is a strong trend to converge to the active equilibrium which is
significant at 5% level for all networks. Therefore, the first observation is that agents still
coordinate on the active equilibrium even though there is an increase of δ. Second, in all
3 networks there are significant increases in the convergence to a specialized equilibrium
which is significant at 1% in Turtle network 5% in Wheel and Circle network. This means
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that the increased effect of δ is significant in all three networks. Specifically, in Turtle and
Circle network, their theoretical equilibrium spans including the specialized equilibrium
while Wheel network’s equilibrium set remains the same. This prediction implies that
the convergence to specialized equilibrium will increase in Circle and Turtle networks.)
However, in Wheel network, theoretically we cannot predict what equilibrium will be
selected. Empirical evidence shows that there is a significant increase on the converging
trends to the specialized equilibrium.
5.2.2 Individual Behavior
This parts is about the individual behavior in each of the networks. First, in the equilib-
rium selection parts, there is a significant increase in the specialized equilibrium. Figure
4 shows the amount of contribution chosen by agents. In all three networks, there is
a significant increases at 1% level on the specialized action as shown in Table 2. This
means that like |λmin|, there is a significant increase in the specialized action. This ef-
fect increases convergence to the specialized equilibrium. Specifically, in Wheel network,
there is an 8% increase toward the specialized action. In Wheel network, there are 12%
increases to specialized actions. In these two networks, there is a significant increases
on the free-riding action. In the case of full contribution there is no significant increases
in both network. This means that the increase of specialized action mostly comes from
the free-riding actions. The difference of free-riding action is statistically increases at 1%
level in both case, while the ratio of full-contribution is not statistically difference in both
case. Theoretically, the increase of δ increase the incentive to free-riding and simulta-
neously increase the full contribution. Our empirical evidence shows that the increase
of δ primarily increase the free-riding effect. In Circle network, there is 22.1% increases
in the specialized action which is the most effective. In Circle network, the increases on
the specialized action comes from the free-riding and full contribution both. They are
increased by 11.2% and 8.6% respectively which is significant at 1% level.
−Figure4−
These results shows that the increase of δ causes the individuals to choose specialized
actions more frequently. This is consistent with the theory because Bramoullé et al. (2014)
point out the specialized action is more prevalent when δ is high.
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5.3 Impact of Asymmetry in Networks
In this section, I investigate the impact of asymmetry in degree distribution of networks.
These features are not captured by the theory of Bramoullé et al. (2014). The asymmetry
in degree distribution refers to when the degree distribution is unequal inside the network.
For example, Circle, Turtle, andWheel networks are symmetric network because all agents
in the networks have the same amount of neighbors. However, Core-periphery network
is an asymmetric in degree distribution because some of the agents in the network have
4 neighbors while some of the agents have 2 neighbors. Core-periphery network has an
average degree of 3 and |λmin| is 2. These are same characteristics with Turtle network.
The sole difference between Core-periphery and Turtle networks is the asymmetry in the
degree distribution.
5.3.1 Equilibrium selection
−Table7−
When δ is 0.75, in the equilibria set, Turtle and Core-periphery networks have multiple
equilibria sets with active and specialized equilibria. Their global network characteristics
including average degree and |λmin| are controlled. First, in Core-periphery network, every
equilibrium selection occurred in the specialized equilibrium. The difference between the
convergence ratio to the specialized equilibrium is significant at 1% level. The difference
is also presented as the period flows in Figure 5.
−Figure5−
Figure 5 shows the amount of equilibrium convergence to the specialized equilibrium
for the first 10 periods , the periods 11 29, and the last 10 periods. In the Core-periphery
network, the convergence ratio increases with the period. This means that the agents’
learning effect is toward the specialized equilibrium, while, in Turtle network, the agents’
learning effect is toward the active equilibrium. In Table 8, I set the dependent variable 1
if agents are coordinate on the specialized equilibrium , 0 if not. Below Table 8 represents
the regression results.
−Table8−
Table 8 shows the regression results for the convergence on the core-periphery net-
works. There is significant increase of convergence to the specialized equilibrium(8.4%)
in Core-periphery network. After I controlled the period dummies for fixed effects, the
results is also robust at 5% level. This result clearly shows that the changes of asymmetry
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inside agents affects the specialized equilibrium selections between agents.
5.3.2 Individual behavior
Asymmetry also affects the specialized actions on the agents. In (Turtle, δ0.75), 56.8%
of agents chose 1. However, about 23.1% of agents chose 1 in Core-periphery network.
The ratio of action are presented below Figure 6. The ratio of agents who chose free
ride increases about 13.2%. Also the ratio of agents who chose full contribution increases
about 21.2%. This means that there is a 33.4% decrease in the proportion who chose
1. These results clearly show that the local characteristics in network(i.e. asymmetry in
degree distribution) have more impact than the global characteristics in network which
is describe in the theory.
−Figure6−
−Figure7−
Figure 7 represent the proportion of individual behavior in Core-periphery network
following each positions. In the core position, 64.1% of agents chose 0 (free-ride), while
74.6% of agents chose 2(full-contribution) in periphery position. These results show that
the local degree distribution of agents plays as a power law of agent. This behavior is an
empirical evidence that the role of local chracteristics can play an important role to the
individual contribution which is not captured by the global network characteristics.
−Table9−
Table 9 shows the regression results for the specialized action in core-periphery net-
works. The fixed effects include the period dummies. Across all specifications, there is
a significant increase in the specialized action in core-periphery networks. It is the first
paper to find the relationship between the specialized action and local network character-
istics after we control the global network characteristics. Therefore, the conclusion of this
section is that asymmetry of degree distribution strongly impacts toward the specialized
action and equilibrium selection.
5.4 Impact of Average Degree
In the theoretical perspective, it does not address the number of links which each agent
has, average degree. Therefore, I controlled network characteristics and check how the
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changes of average degree in networks affects the equilibrium selection on the networks
and individual behavior.
5.4.1 Equilibrium selection
−Table10−
Table 10 shows the equilibrium selection comparison between (Circle, δ0.35) and (Tur-
tle, δ0.35). Both networks have the same unique active equilibrium. Note that the frequency
of convergence decrease 6.7% which is significant at 5% level. This result implies that local
degree distribution of agents plays as a focal point to the agents.
The two network have the same active and unique equilibrium set when they belong
to δ = 0.35. Therefore in the case of δ = 0.35, it is worthwhile to determine whether there
is a difference in equilibrium selection even though they have a same equilibria set. This
could be important because we can verify in what circumstance people frequently can
coordinate on the equilibrium. In the circumstance of δ = 0.75 , they have the multiple
equilibria set. Specifically, both networks have one active equilibrium and one specialzied
equilibrium. In the circle network, each agent has the same number of neighbors as 2. On
the other hand, in the Turtle network, each agent has 3 neigbors. They have symmetric
degree distribution.
In the equilibrium selection part, the effect of choosing active equilibrium has increased
in Circle network. Table 10 shows the amount of frequency coordinate on the equilibrium.
It is quite interesting that the frequency of convergence in the active equilibrium is much
higher in Circle Network. This is because people have more equal contribution on the
equilibrium set. This result is in line of the result with Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012)
who showed that in public good games played on network, people have a tendency to
locally coordinate more on the network that have lower average degrees.
5.4.2 Individual behavior
The percentage of choosing the specialized action is different across the networks with
regards to individual behavior. There is a significant increase on the behavior of choosing
the specialized action in the high degree cases. Table 11 shows regression results. they are
statistically significant at 5% level In summary, There was a significant increase on the
number of people those who select moderate contribution. Model (1) shows that there
is 32% increase in the specialized behavior. This result is also robust if we controlled
the fixed effect and other individual properties. In summary, as average degree increases,
people have a tendency to select specialized actions.
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−Table11−
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper explore the effect of network characteristics in network positions in an exper-
iment in which actions are strategic substitutes. The theory behind this experiment is
given by Bramoullé et al. (2014).
Main treatment variable in the experiment is the structure of the underlying network,
especially the lowest eigenvalue of networks. This paper find that individual behavior
is significantly affected by the lowest eigenvalue but it is difficult to change equilibrium
selection because the treatment effect is not strong. Regarding payoff discount factor, in
general, exhibits clear effect to the equilibrium selection. This paper finds there is clear
increase on the specialized equilibrium when the payoff discount factor is high.
Another main result of this paper, asymmetric degree distribution have most signif-
icant effect to the equilibrium selection. This results implies that the incentive to free-
riding drastically increases if agents have many neighbors. This results is consistent with
the finding of Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012) because they find the free-riding incentive
increases as the degree centrality of agents increases. Lastly, average degree of networks
also plays important role to equilibrium selection. Especially, this paper confirms that
the as average degree increases, people sustain specialized equilibrium more frequently.
This implies that
Although all subjects had complete information about the whole network structure
and although these structures were quite simple, the subjects often seem to behave as if
they were only partially informed about the network structure like Kosfeld (2004) find.
This finding may indicate that, in order to fully understand behavior on networks, theory
should focus on models with local networks characteristics rather than global network
structure, such as, Galeotti et al. (2010). This paper confirms that people behave with
limited information about network structure even though the structure of network is quite
simple.
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Table 1: Network characteristics of treatments.
Network δ |λmin| Equilibrium Average Degree Degree Distribution
Turtle
0.35
2
Unique
3 Symmetric
0.75 Multiple
Wheel
0.35
3
Multiple
3 Symmetric
0.75 Multiple
Cricle
0.35
2
Unique
2 Symmetric
0.75 Multiple
Core-periphery 0.75 2 Multiple 3 Asymmetric
Table 2: Equilibrium Prediction
Network δ |λmin| Equilibrium profile Characterization
Turtle
0.35
2
(1,1,1,1,1,1) Active
0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1) Active
(2,1,0,2,1,0) Specialized
Wheel
0.35
3
(1,1,1,1,1,1) Active
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized
0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1) Active
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized
Circle
0.35
2
(1,1,1,1,1,1) Active
0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1) Active
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized
Core-periphery 0.75 2
(1,1,1,1,1,1) Active
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized
Table 3: Summary statistics
Treatments Subjects Sessions Earnings
avg max min
(Turtle,δ0.35) 36 2 $14.4 $18.2 $12.9
(Turtle,δ0.75) 36 2 $19.3 $24.4 $16.9
(Wheel,δ0.35) 36 3 $14.1 $19.9 $12.3
(Wheel,δ0.75) 36 2 $18.9 $24.0 $13.1
(Circle,δ0.35) 36 2 $12.1 $14.5 $11.5
(Circle,δ0.75) 36 3 $15.7 $17.2 $14.0
(Core-periphery,δ0.75) 36 3 $18.2 $25.6 $10.2
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Table 4: Equilibrium convergence : |λmin|
Network |λmin| δ Equilibrium profile Characterization N Convergence(%)
(Turtle, δ0.35) 2 0.35 (1,1,1,1,1,1) Unique 240 80(33.3%)
(Wheel, δ0.35) 3 0.35
(1,1,1,1,1,1)
240
72(30%)
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized 6(2.5%)
Table 5: Regression for the specialized actions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wheel 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.062**
(0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0233)
Fixed effect no yes yes yes
Woman no no yes yes
Risk Averse no no no yes
Constant 0.279*** 0.201*** 0.203** 0.234***
(0.0156) (0.0659) (0.0686) (0.0700)
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920
R-squared 0.033 0.200 0.200 0.200
Table 6: Equilibrium Convergence : δ
Network |λmin| δ Equilibrium profile Characterization N Convergence(%)
Turtle 2 0.35 (1,1,1,1,1,1) Unique 240 80(33.3%)
Turtle 2 0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1)
240
48(20%)
(2,1,0,2,1,0) Specialized 15(6.6%)
Wheel 3 0.35
(1,1,1,1,1,1)
240
72(30%)
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized 6(2.5%)
Wheel 3 0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1)
240
35(14.5%)
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized 14(6.4%)
Circle 2 0.35 (1,1,1,1,1,1) Unique 240 96(40%)
Circle 2 0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1)
240
71(29.5%)
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized 8(3.3%)
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Table 7: Equilibrium Convergence
Network |λmin| δ Equilibrium profile Characterization N Convergence(%)
Turtle 2 0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1)
240
48(20%)
(2,1,0,2,1,0) Specialized 15(6.6%)
Core-periphery 2 0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1)
240
0(0%)
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized 62(25.8%)
Table 8: Regression for the specialized equilibrium
(1) (2)
Core-periphery 0.184*** 0.171***
(0.0380) (0.0387)
Fixed effect no yes
Woman no yes
Risk averse no yes
Constant 0.0668*** 0.0644
(0.0156) (0.0659)
Observations 480 480
R-squared 0.014 0.104
Table 9: Regression for the specialized actions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Core-periphery 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.330****
(0.0238) (0.0240) (0.0226) (0.0235)
Fixed effect no yes yes yes
Woman no no yes yes
Risk Averse no no no yes
Constant 0.446*** 0.505*** 0.504*** 0.449***
(0.0164) (0.0687) (0.0707) (0.0845)
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920
R-squared 0.109 0.151 0.151 0.152
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Table 10: Equilibrium Convergence
Network AvgDegree |λmin| δ Equilibrium Character N Converge(%)
Circle 2 2 0.35 (1,1,1,1,1,1) Unique 240 96(40%)
Turtle 3 2 0.35 (1,1,1,1,1,1) Unique 240 80(33.3%)
Circle 2 2 0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1)
240
71(29.5%)
(2,0,2,0,2,0) Specialized 8(3.3%)
Turtle 3 2 0.75
(1,1,1,1,1,1)
240
48(20%)
(2,1,0,2,1,0) Specialized 15(6.6%)
Table 11: Regression for the specialized actions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turtle 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.330****
(0.0238) (0.0240) (0.0226) (0.0235)
Fixed effect no yes yes yes
Woman no no yes yes
Risk Averse no no no yes
Constant 0.446*** 0.505*** 0.504*** 0.449***
(0.0164) (0.0687) (0.0707) (0.0845)
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920
R-squared 0.109 0.151 0.151 0.152
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Figure 1: Treatments
Figure 2: Equilibrium convergence : across periods
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Figure 3: Contribution across treatments
Figure 4: Contribution across treatments
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Figure 5: Specialized equilibrium selection across period
Figure 6: Contribution across treatments
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Figure 7: Contribution across core and periphery position
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